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Is Annual Style Change in the Automobile
Industry an Unfair Method of
Competition? A Rebuttal
Stephen E. Selander'*
Two years ago, a Note in this Journal1 argued that annual style
change in the automobile industry is an unfair method of competition
which creates and preserves concentrated economic power. The Note is,
however, based on errors severe enough to invalidate its basic thesis.
Before proceeding with a detailed analysis, one fundamental point
should be considered. The Note fails to recognize that if style change
is desired by consumers, this "unfair method of competition" does
nothing more than answer consumer demand-something which is not,
and should not be, illegal under the antitrust laws absent an intent to
monopolize.
Analysis of the industry supports the view that consumers prefer
annually redesigned cars.2 Lawrence White found that "the market
allocation, stressing model changes, probably reflects accurately con-
sumer preferences." 3 Indeed, the Note's theory that annual style change
creates and preserves concentrated economic power rests on an implicit
premise that annually redesigned cars are preferred, for if change were
not desired, non-change firms would enter the industry, prosper, and
expand.
Even if annual style change did have the economic impact the Note
suggests, it should still be legal as a legitimate attempt to meet con-
sumer demand. In fact, however, annual style change was not a fun-
damental factor in the evolution of the automobile industry.
* Third-year student, U. of Mich. Law School. M.A. Economics, U. of Mich. (193). This
project was started during a legal clerkship for General Motors in the summer of 1971.
1. Note, Annual Style Change In The Automobile Industry As An Unfair Method of
Competition, 80 YALE L.J. 567 (1971) [hereinafter cited as the Note]. Bradford C. Snell,
a student editor, is listed as the contributor of the Note. 80 YALE L.J. 515.
2. According to the Note, GM, adopting a style change policy, increased its sales from
thirteen to forty-three percent of the total industry sales in the five years between 1922
and 1927, while Ford's share fell from fifty-one to nine percent during this same period
because of its failure to respond with style changes. Note at 579-80. These statistics over-
emphasize the impact of style change, since Ford's production facilities were shut down
in June of 1927 in order to convert for production of the Model A. The first Model A's
were not sold until December 1927. See E. KENNEDY, THE AuTo~sontLE INDUS=h, 190, 199
(1941). However, it does appear that the change to the Model A ias a response to the
declining sales of the non-style change Model T between 1923 and 1926.
3. L. WNHr, THE AuTOMmOBIE INDus'MY SINc 1945, at 210 (1971).
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I. The Early Structure of the Automobile Industry and the
Advent of Style Change
The Note argues that General Motors' institution of a policy of
annual style change in 19234 caused several significant changes in the
structure of the automobile industry. However, major errors in the
Note's description of these changes undermine the Note's conclusions
about the causes of the changes.
A. Total Number of Producers
One dimension of market structure which, according to the Note,
underwent significant change in 1923 was the degree of seller concen-
tration, that is "the number and the size distribution of sellers in the
market."' 5 The Note indicates that the number of firms in the automo-
bile industry grew to a high of eighty-eight in 1921 and that "about
1923, the number of automobile producers began to decline rapidly."
It then adds: "Prior to the introduction of annual style change in
1923, entry into the automobile industry was relatively easy, exits were
insubstantial in number and concentration was consequently low."
Finally, the Note contends that between 1923 and 1926, forty-six firms
left the industry, and that by 1935 only ten firms were still producing
automobiles.8
The facts, however, do not support the theory that this decline in
the number of firms resulted from the introduction of annual style
change. The number of exits before 1923 was ninety-four, with an
average of 6.31 exits per year between 1910 and 1922.0 The average
increased only slightly between 1923 and 1930.10
The Note's figure of ten firms in 1935 was taken from Dr. Ruby
Turner Norris' testimony on administered prices in the automobile
industry." Dr. Norris traced the life span of thirty-nine firms which
4. Although, in 1923, General Motors did start introducing annual models, this was
not yet a formal company policy. See A. SLOAN, MY YEARS WITH GENERAL MOTORS 152,
163, 165-68 (1964).
5. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 7 (2d ed. 1968).
6. Note at 577.
7. Id. at 578.
8. Id.
9. R. EPSTEIN, THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY, ITS ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOP-
MENT 176 (1928). It should be noted that Epstein defines "exit" to include dropping a
make of automobile, even if the company continues in business. Id. at 165-68. T Is defi-
nition does not have the normal economic sinificance associated with the word "exit."
It also makes comparability of exit statistics difficult.
10. AUToMOTIvE NEws, 1970 ALMANAC 40-41 (1970). Although comparability is diffi-
cult, this author believes the average number of exits increased to about 8.0 per year.
11. SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST & MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
85TH CONG. 2D SESS., STUDY OF ADMINISTERED PRICES IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 9 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as ADMINISTERED PRICES].
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she considered to be most of the principal producers in the history of
the industry. Of the thirty-nine, only twenty-four were producing at
the beginning of 1923 when style change started. Between 1923 and
1929, the number of firms declined by nine: four through merger,12
five through failure.13 Of the latter five, the largest, Chandler, ac-
counted for only 20,268 new car registrations in its best year' 4-approxi-
mately forty percent of the minimum efficient scale which the Note
later argues a non-style change producer needs.l" Thus, it would appear
annual style change played little if any role in the decline in numbers
between 1923 and 1929.
Five more companies failed between 1930 and 1935, leaving only ten
in the industry.' 6 Again, none of these five was near the minimum effi-
cient level for a non-style change producer; the biggest fell short by
forty percent in its largest production year.' 7 Obviously, the Depression
was a major factor in the elimination of these lower volume car pro-
ducers.' s
While there was thus no significant change in the number of exits
associated with annual style change, there was a noticeable decline in
the number of new firms entering the industry. It is not, of course,
possible to know precisely who considered entering the industry, or
their reasons for failing to do so. However, reasons can be postulated
for the decline in the rate of entry after about 1920 that seem at least
as plausible as annual style change.
First, the rate of growth of demand declined. The automobile indus-
try moved from an era of rapidly rising demand, when consumers were
switching from other modes of transportation to the auto, to a situa-
tion where demand was relatively constant.'0
[Before 1922] [A]ny ambitious manufacturer . . . who could get
hold of some capital and some engineering brains and could make
a fairly good product, could come in and take a slice of the middle,
12. Chalmers merged with Maxwell, Lafayette with Nash, Pierce-Arrow with Stu-
debaker, and Dodge with Chrysler. See id. at chart facing 9.
13. Stearns Knight, Locomobile, Peerless, Moon and Chandler failed. See id.
14. AuiOtoTVE NEWS, supra note 10, at 40.
15. The Note at 581 indicates the minimum efficient scale is 50,000 units for an auto-
mobile assembler.
16. Franklin, Auburn, Reo, Nordyhe-Marmon, and Kissel failed between 1930 and
1935. AD MINISrERED PRICES, supra note 11, at chart facing 9.
17. AusroAitonvE NEws, supra note 10, at 40.
18. See ADMINISrERED PRICES, supra note 11, at 9.
19. Epstein found that in the 1920's and 1930's there was no general increase in auto-
mobile production. See Trial Transcript, at 1755, Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.,
44 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). United States production of automobiles in 1923 was
4,034,012, while in 1928, it was 4,358,748. NATIL AuTo.uomLE CItMBnER OF COIMERCF,
FACTS & FIGURES OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 13 (1930).
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the lower-middle, or the upper-middle car market. But after 1922-
1923, because of what had come into the total picture-this stabi-
lized total demand-it took a very different kind of brains and
imagination and management quality to make a success in the
automobile industry, because the total demand had ceased to grow,
and if any producer wanted to increase his sales, he had to take
it out of somebody else's share, and that meant real competition.20
Moreover, the character of demand changed in the 1920's from an ini-
tial to a replacement demand.21 Many purchasers were now repeating
buyers of the same make that they had originally owned. Many pre-
ferred to purchase from companies whose products were known for
their dependability, rather than to gamble on a new firm. It would
not be surprising, therefore, if this change in demand also discouraged
new entry. In fact, the few new entrants in the industry during the
1920's were individuals who had made names for themselves with other
automobile companies.
22
Second, a major change in body production occurred during the
1920's. In 1919, only 10.3 percent of the bodies produced were closed;
by 1926, this had increased to seventy-four percent.2a The change from
open, wooden bodies to closed, steel ones increased the minimum effi-
cient scale of body production. 24 This would appear to be another
strong explanation for a decline in entry.
Finally, the 1920's brought the installment purchase, with trade-ins
as down payment. This caused the used car to become a significant
component of supply. 25 Thus, a new entrant had to compete not only
with new car manufacturers, but also with the used car salesmen.
B. Concentration of Sellers
The Note also asserts that annual style change increased the concen-
tration of sellers. It states that "not until the 1920's did the three lead-
20. Trial Transcript, at 1759, Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960
(S.D.N.Y. 1942).
21. Between 1923 and 1928, the percentage of American purchases going to new or
multiple car buyers fell from 69.9 percent to 27.4 percent. The purchases representing
replacements of old cars rose from twenty-one percent to 54.6 percent during the same
period. FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 19, at 14.
22. William Durant started four new firms in 1922. Walter Flanders and B.F. Everitt
were principals in the Rickenbacker Motor Car Company. Walter Chrysler started Chrys-
ler. All of these men were experienced men who had been in the auto industry for sev-
eral years. Frank L. Klingensmith, a Ford Treasurer and General Manager, started Gray
Motor Company.
23. See Stillman, Another Record-Breaking Year, 56 AUTrOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES 227, 229
(1927).
24. See Schipper, Improved But Cheaper Closed Bodies Are Predicted, 47 AUTol0orivy.
INDUsTRIES 127 (1922).
25. See SLOAN, supra note 4, at 282.
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ing firms in the auto industry account for much more than half of total
sales." 26 Later, it contends that "[w]hile aggressively pursuing annual
style change, GM, Chrysler, and Ford increased their collective share
of industry sales from less than 65 percent in 1923 to more than 90
percent by 1935."27
From the Note's own statistics on concentration, however, it would
appear that the three largest firms increased sales from about fifty per-
cent to sixty-five percent while pursuing a non-style change policy be-
tween 1920 and 1923. From 1923 to 1928 (years with style change), con-
centration increased only four percentage points, from sixty-five to
sixty-nine percent.28 From 1929 to 1935 concentration increased from
seventy to ninety percent. But in this latter period, the Depression was
surely a major factor. It is thus difficult to attribute the overall increase
in concentration between 1923 and 1935 to annual style change.
Moreover, the Note's statistical assertions are at the least misleading.
The FTC report cited indicates that the two leading firms had more
than fifty percent of sales from 1913 on. The concentration for two
firms in 1919 was 60.85 percent, increasing to 68.41 percent by 1921.29
This was, of course, due to Ford's large share of the market, but it does
indicate that substantial concentration existed in the industry before
the advent of annual style change.
Data supplied by other economists also cast doubt on the Note's
view of concentration. According to Weiss, when Chrysler's predecessor,
Dodge, is included, the Big Three accounted for nearly eighty percent
of the market in 1921.30 From 1923 to 1929, the concentration ratio
was below the 1921 figure, with the share of the smaller firms increas-
ing slightly, although in an erratic manner. Thus, Weiss' analysis also
indicates that the Note is wrong about pre-style change concentration
and raises serious doubt as to whether style change caused any signifi-
cant increase in concentration.
II. Concentration and Style Change-The Economic Analysis
The Note argues that annual style change led to and preserved con-
centration in the industry. According to the Note, components inte-
gration, franchised distribution, large-scale advertising, and heavy capi-
26. Note at 579.
27. Id. at 580.
28. Id. at 571 n.21.
29. Compare id. at 579 n.60 with FEaaAL TPaE COim'N, REI'ORT o.v Timu M'on
VEHncr.E INDusRaY 29 (1939).
30. See L. WaIss, EcoOMIcs AND AMrmucAN INusmy 327 (1967).
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tal requirements for new entry are derivatives of the style-change strat-
egy.3' In addition, the Note claims, style change forces small firms to
suffer the cost of "premature" scrapping of tools and dies, thus squeez-
ing small assembly firms out of the industry.
32
Contrary to the Note's analysis, however, annual style change played
an insignificant role in the evolution of the automobile industry. There
are sound economic causes for the industry's structure which have lit-
tle or nothing to do with style change.
A. Style Change and Vertical Integration
1. Upstream Integration into Components Production
The Note suggests that annual style change led to integration of car
assembly and components production.
An inevitable result of the drive to produce "all new" cars an-
nually was an industry trend toward components integration. Pre-
viously, producers had attained optimal efficiency at low output
volumes by assembling basically interchangeable body and engine
components purchased from external suppliers. 33
The Note, however, fails to point out that "previously" refers-in the
sources cited-to the period between 1902 and 1909.34 Weiss presents a
far clearer picture of the timing and levels of vertical integration:
As they accumulated capital, the larger auto makers began produc-
ing some of the components for their cars. By the start of World
War I, practically all of the firms of lasting importance were pro-
ducing at least their own motors, so that they could plausibly claim
distinct and superior products. During the shortages of World
War i, the drive of manufacturers to produce their own supplies
was accelerated. Ford seems to have become obsessed with self-
sufficiency.... Capital requirements in the beginning had been
little more than an investment in parts and payroll while cars were
in process, but any new automobile producer from World War I
on had to invest millions in plant and equipment, as well.30
31. Note at 577.
32. Id. at 608.
33. Id. at 580.
34. See id. at 580 n.70. Vatter, The Closure of Entry in the American Automobile
Industry, 4 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 213 (1952) refers to the 1905 description of the industry
at 216-17. Lanzillotti, The Automobile Industry, in W. ADAMS, THE STRUCrURE or A, EaI-
CAN INDUSTRY 314 (1961), describes the period between 1902 and 1909.
35. WEiss, supra note 30, at 331-32. See also J. RAE, THE AMERICAN Atrro,*oniLE,
A BRIEF HistoRY 96 (1965).
Vol. 82: 691, 197.3
A Rebuttal
Thus, components integration was a substantial factor in the automo-
bile industry long before annual style change.
Economists would predict vertical integration whenever the costs
of outside market transactions are greater than the costs of accomplish-
ing the same results within the firm. Bain notes some of the economies
to be derived from integrating the production of components with their
assembly:
[E]conomies are usually attributed to improved coordination of
the rates of output at the successive stages (through placing them
under one management), consequent reduction of intermediate
inventories, and elimination of the expense of purchase-sale trans-
actions in moving goods from one stage to the next.30
The complex nature of automobiles also increases the desirability of
vertical integration. White states:
The advantages of unified coordination and control extend be-
yond just one plant. The complex process of designing, producing,
testing, and modifying an automobile requires a high degree of
coordination. Engine transmission, frame, body, brakes, wind-
shield, and other components all have to perform well with each
other and have to be in the right place at the right time and in
the right quantities. A failure in the supply of any component
can spell disaster.37
Thus, it is not surprising that the automobile industry moved towards
vertical integration, even before annual style change.
Another factor evidently leading to vertical integration is product
differentiation, which as the Note indicates38 has served as a key ele-
ment in competition since the industry's beginnings. To the extent
that the components of the product are unique and require non-stand-
ardized design, "close control and perhaps secrecy will be required to
design, develop, and coordinate these components." 30 Annual style
change would make coordination more important in the automobile
industry, but it is still only one factor leading an automobile firm to
recognize the efficiencies attained by the vertical integration of com-
ponents production.
36. BAN, supra note 5, at 177-78.
37. WHTE, supra note 3, at 78.
38. See Note at 579.
39. Wiirr, supra note 3, at 78.
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2. Downstream Integration into Distribution
The Note also argues that annual style change required the automo-
bile firms to integrate distribution and car assembly activities:
[T]he need to differentiate the appearance of automobiles annu-
ally and the consequent decline in the interchangeability of com-
ponents required the establishment of unique nationwide service
organizations.
40
This allegedly placed small firms at a disadvantage because of the capi-
tal required for, and the economies of scale associated with, a nation-
wide dealer system. Again, however, factors other than annual style
change can better explain the emergence of nationwide service organi-
zations.
Indeed, the dealer system began before the introduction of annual
style change. Lanzillotti indicates that about 1910 "[a] large number
of well-financed dealers across the country was recognized as essential
for survival .... ,"4 Between 1910 and 1920, the dealer system grew
from 8,402 to 30,771 dealers.42 Ford alone had 7,000 dealers in 191340
and 17,000 by 1921, 44 two years before the introduction of annual style
change.
As the automobile became an established method of transportation
and the nation developed its highway network, consumers became un-
willing to buy a new car without an assurance of reliable service wher-
ever they traveled. Because of product differentiation, a service center
might need special equipment for diagnosing the problems of a particu-
lar car. Similarly, product differentiation meant that there were differ-
ences in components 'between the various makes. Such factors suggest
that it would be desirable to have a service center specialize in only a
few makes of cars.
Moreover, adequate nationwide service obviously requires several
thousand dealers. The Note is correct in stating that the scale for effi-
cient distribution is far larger than the scale for efficient assembly.40
However, it is not at all clear that elimination of annual style change
would significantly reduce the efficient scale for distribution. Nor is it
clear that the establishment-for whatever reasons-of a nationwide
40. Note at 584.
41. Lanzillotti, supra note 34, at 315.
42. FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 19, at 42.
43. RAE, supra note 35, at 61.
44. Id. at 82.
45. See B. PASHIGIAN, THE DISRIBUTON OF AUTOMOBILES, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM 238-39 (1961).
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dealer system called for tremendous capital by small automobile pro-
ducers. In general, capital for these dealerships comes from sources
other than the automobile manufacturers.4" The auto maker occasion-
ally provides some financial protection for the dealer on his inventory
of spare parts, but the normal procedure is for the dealer to finance his
own inventory. It was such independent financing which made the
dealer system attractive to manufacturers in the early days of the in-
dustry.47 There is no evidence, therefore, that the establishment of
nationwide service systems placed unreasonable capital requirements
on small manufacturers.
B. The "Premature" Scrapping of Tools and Dies
The Note also argues that annual style change significantly raised
the costs of small firms by necessitating "premature" scrappage of tools
and dies and increased the scale necessary for survival in the indus-
try.48 These disadvantages allegedly caused small firms to fail, and dis-
couraged new ones from entering. There are, however, several errors
in this analysis which may invalidate its conclusions.
In Figure I of the Note,49 reproduced here, a hypothetical small
assembly firm, X, is compared with GM, a large firm integrated up-
stream into components manufacture. The Note assumes that, without
style change (in 1923), both firms face the same average costs (per car
produced), AC. Producing at 50,000 cars a year, X has just "achieved
the minimum level of output for optimally efficient assembly opera-





X 193 ""GM GM
X923 1924 1923
Output 50,000 250,000 500,000 +
FIGURE I
46. See ADmINIsrED PRICFs, supra note 11, at 16 n.28.
47. See RAF, supra note 35, at 18-19, 81-82.
48. Note at 580-83.
49. Id. at 581.
50. Id.
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can be achieved). But style change (in 1924) allegedly raises the relevant
cost curve to AC1, which exceeds AC for all production volumes of
less than 250,000 cars per year. In explaining this increase, the Note
observes that style change forces the small firm to purchase "the ex-
pensive tools and dies necessary for the integrated production of
uniquely styled vehicles,"' and that-because these tools and dies do
not "physically deteriorate" until they have produced 250,000 cars-
annual style change forces a small firm to scrap dies and tools "prema-
turely." Since physical deterioration would dictate annual die scrap-
page in a firm producing 250,000 units even if style change were not
practiced, the introduction of style change does not alter the average
costs of this firm. The Note concludes that "[a]fter 1923 ...survival
as a style change manufacturer required construction of a plant capa-
ble of producing at least 250,000 automobiles per year from internally
manufactured and annually altered components." U
2
This analysis is seriously misleading. It attributes to style change
cost differentials between large and small firms caused in large part by
economies of scale which exist whether or not style change is prac-
ticed; the analysis also confuses the concepts of survival and of mini-
mum efficient size.
First, the curve AC, includes total tooling costs on a per car basis,53
while curve AC includes no tooling costs at all. Even if style change is
not practiced, an unintegrated assembly firm purchasing metal bodies
from an independent supplier will have to cover the supplier's tooling
costs; the supplier cannot, after all, operate at a loss. It is absurd to
compare the average costs of "production" without tooling costs to the
average costs including tooling and then to attribute the difference to
style change.54 As argued above, style change is not the cause of ver-
tical integration in the industry."5 And even if it were, integration
could not rationally be viewed as the source of components costs; an
51. Id. at 582.
52. Id.
53. Although the Note never explicitly states that AC excludes tooling costs, the Note
at 581 n.74 indicates that its graphical analysis follows Menge. The Menge analysis uses
an average cost curve with no toolings costs as its starting point. See Menge, Style Change
Costs as a Market Weapon, 76 Q.J. OF ECON. 632, 634-43 (1962).
54. When tooling costs are included the firm with the lower rate of output will have
higher per unit costs irrespective of style change. Annual style change may increase these
costs even more because of additional tooling expenditures. However, if non.style change
cars are not desired, it makes no sense to talk about an "efficient" non.style change pro-
ducer, because the price consumers are willing to pay will be less than the costs. (Other-
wise, the non-style change producer would be able to compete effectively in the market.)
If price is less than costs, for the non-style change producer, resources should be allocated
away from producing the non-style change car.
55. See pp. 696-99 supra.
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unintegrated assembly firm pays such costs whenever it purchases com-
ponents from suppliers.
Second, by showing X and GM at the same average cost level along
curve AG, the Note ignores the fact that the larger firm will enjoy scale
economies in the components industry unavailable to the smaller.a
Although at 50,000 cars per year, X may have achieved minimum aver-
age costs in assembly operations, it will have to pay more for compo-
nents than will the large firm.57 Discussing such economies, Scherer
states:
Special machines can be designed to perform certain tasks at a
considerable savings of time and labor. But the small scale pro-
ducer may find no advantage in adopting them, because they can-
not be scaled down and would therefore be idle much of the time
leaving a small number of units of output to bear the full burden
of their capital costs. For instance, a large automobile engine plant
can save millions of dollars annually by investing in automated
cylinder boring, valve seating, and work piece transfer machines,
while the low volume producer must opt for slower, more labor
intensive, general purpose machine tools.s
Examination of components production suggests that there are econ-
omies of scale directly associated with efficient die utilization. Accord-
ing to the Note, dies are capable of producing 250,000 units a year.50
If this is true, the assembler needing only 50,000 units utilizes the dies
only twenty percent of the time, allowing them to stand idle eighty
percent of the time. There will be higher overhead costs for such a
smaller firm (or its components supplier), because of the space re-
quired to house the idle dies. Furthermore, dies are used in presses to
stamp out the metal parts of components-presses also capable of pro-
ducing far more than 50,000 units per year. Although a firm may fully
utilize its presses by producing several different components, addi-
tional time and costs are involved in setting up and taking down these
presses for several shorter production runs.
56. See J. BAIN, BARImERS o NEW ComprrTON 245-47 (1956) indicates economies of
scale in body production from 300,000 to 600,000 units); VHrrE. supra note 3, at 38 (indi-
cates that the largest economies in body production occur at 400,000 units).
57. Of course if there were no product differentiation, several small assemblers could
buy standardized components from a supplier capable of achieving economies of scale in
components production. But it is unrealistic to exclude product differentiation, and
impermissible to attribute to style change the effects of that artificial exclusion.
58. F. SCHERER, INDUsTRiAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND Ecoxo.tc P.RFONTANCE 73 (1970).
59. The Note may imply dies are capable of producing 250,000 units per one-third
year, since GM produced 775,000 automobiles in 1923, and, according to the Note,
exhausted three sets of dies. Note at 581. The point made in the text above does not,
however, turn on any particular set of numbers.
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Thus the "premature scrappage" argument itself suggests that-re-
gardless of premature scrappage and style change-the small firm will
have higher average costs than the large firm. Assume that there is no
style change and that a die can be purchased for C dollars. The large
firm must purchase a die every year, so that its average cost will be
C/250,000. The small firm uses one die for five years. The Note im-
plicitly assumes that these costs can be spread over five years, so that
annual average costs for the small firm would equal those for the large
firm: 1/5 times C/50,000 equals C/250,000. But this ignores the fact
that the small firm has tied up C dollars for five years, and that this
is costly-a cost expressed by the interest rate on loans. A large firm
escapes such "time charges," thus enjoying an important economy of
scale.
A second error in the Note's analysis of "premature scrappage" is the
assumption that conclusions about a firm's "survival" may be derived
from discussions about minimum efficient firm size. Whenever the
price of a firm's product equals or exceeds average cost, the firm will
be making a profit and will be able to survive. Thus, a firm need not
attain minimum average cost to survive. Survival depends on the re-
lationship of price to average cost. The Note correctly observes that
premature scrapping will, other things being equal, increase the aver-
age costs of any firm producing less than 250,000 cars a year. But the
amount of this increase is not stated; nor is any procedure advanced
for measuring it. And the relationship of price to average costs, which
is crucial for the question of survival, receives no attention. We are,
of course, given a diagram. But, on it, curve AC, implies that the break-
even or survival volume of a firm under style change (i.e., the point
where price equals average cost) is only 60,000-units-per-year, which
does not seem prohibitively large. In short, the Note's diagram and dis-
cussion provide no basis for its conclusion that style change established
a production requirement of 250,000 units per year for survival.
C. "Massive" Advertising and Annual Style Change
The Note suggests that the policy of annual style change was respon-
sible for massive advertising. It argues that when the designs of auto-
mobiles remain basically unchanged for a substantial period of time,
the public becomes familiar with them and there is little need to
"repeatedly call the public's attention to the outstanding features of
unchanged models."60
60. Note at 578 n.56.
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In 1967-68, advertising as a percentage of sales for various industries
was as follows: 01
Soap and Related Products 10.89%
Bottled Soft Drinks, Flavorings 6.37
Tobacco 6.04
Chemicals, Allied Products 4.23




All Industrial Groups 1.17
It should be noted that advertising expenditures are high in some
industries which sell differentiated products but where there is no
appreciable style change. This would suggest that although the public
is familiar-with the product, there is still the need to "repeatedly call
the public's attention to the outstanding features of unchanged
models."
White found that advertising averages about $65 per car, $40 spent
by the manufacturer and $25 by the dealer.0 2 The Note gives no indi-
cation as to the proportion of this figure which can be associated with
style change. 63 One study found that between 1956 and 1960 only $14
in advertising expenses was due to style change.0'
D. Annual Style Change and Increased Capital Requirements
A final factor which the Note examines is the increase in capital re-
quirements allegedly caused by annual style change. The Note reasons
that annual style change increased the capital requirements of firms
because "each of the three factors necessary for annual style change
involved tremendous capital investments of hundreds of millions of
dollars." 65 But, as argued above,00 annual style change was not a sig-
61. Percentage of Sales Invested in Advertising in 1967-68, ADvERmTNc AGE, January 25,
1971, at 77.
62. wHIrE, supra note 3. at 224.
63. Volkswagen spent $44 per car in the United States in 196'1. Wtrrr, supra note 3,
at 334 n.13. However the Note might argue that Volkswagen would have spent less, if
there was no necessity to compete in a style change market.
64. Fisher, Griliches & Kaysen, The Costs of Automobile Model Changes Since 1949,
70 J. POL. ECON. 433, 437 (1962).
65. Note at 584.
66. See pp. 696-702 supra.
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nificant cause of components integration, "massive" advertising, or the
dealer franchise system.
The Note also argues that capital required for style change has pre-
served concentration:
In 1970, it would cost a company $779 million to enter the auto-
mobile industry. The costs of annual style change capability, it is
estimated, account for fully $724 million, or more than 90 per-
cent of this figure. 7
But the Note misrepresents what the figures actually show. They merely
compare the capital required by an automobile assembler with the capi-
tal required by a fully-integrated manufacturer. To attribute to style
change all of the differences between mere assembly and full integration





Activity 300,000 Units 60,000 Units
Production $250 M $50 M
Distribution 326 M -
Advertising 23 M 5 M
Retooling 180 M -
Total $779 M $55 M
Production: The Note does not provide sufficient information to
determine whether its comparison at the production stage is valid. It
assumes that the capital required for a 60,000 unit assembler is one-fifth
that required for the 300,000 unit producer.0 9 However, it seems
equally plausible that economies of vertical integration and economies
of scale in components production may allow the integrated producer
to produce with less than five times the capital required by the
assembler.
Distribution: The Note's treatment of distribution costs is clearly in
error. It is unreasonable to suggest that an assembler can distribute
60,000 cars with no distribution costs whatsoever, while the integrated
concern must spend $326 million. The Note apparently does not in-
67. Id. at 588.
68. Id. at 588-89 n.115.
69. Id. at 589 n.118.
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dude the capital the assembler requires for distribution because such
capital comes from sources other than the assembler. However, under
the dealer franchise system used by integrated firms today, independent
businessmen provide the capital just as they would if distributors were
legally independent of assemblers. The Note's source of information
in fact recognized that capital is traditionally raised by independents.
Thus, it is incorrect to include such costs as a capital requirement
solely of the integrated firm.
Advertising: The Note assumes that the hypothetical assembler will
require no more advertising dollars per car than the larger integrated
producer. Yet economies of scale of advertising7' may well invalidate
this assumption. It would appear that some fairly high absolute level of
expenditures must be reached before a nationwide campaign becomes
effective. This level of expenditures is not related directly to the vol-
ume of output but rather is related to contacts with consumers. Thus,
the small assembler would probably have higher costs per car associ-
ated with advertising.
Tooling: The Note's analysis of tooling costs is inconsistent with
its earlier argument. In discussing the "premature scrapping" of tools
and dies, the Note states:
In 1923, it [GM] exhausted three full sets of dies and tools in pro-
ducing a record 775,000 automobiles [point GM 1923 in Figure I].
Thus, it could replace the 1923 dies and tools with identical equip-
ment or, at no extra cost, with dissimilar equipment. Conse-
quently, GM changed the style characteristics of its 1924 models
without increasing its costs . ... .
This implies that annual style change was not responsible for the capi-
tal required for retooling. Yet in discussing the added capital re-
quirements necessitated by style change, the Note includes $180 mil-
lion, the total "tooling" costs of the integrated producer. The Note
not only fails to explain this discrepancy, but is also misleading as to
what the $180 million of "retooling" includes. The Note's estimate of
"retooling" expenditures,
was obtained by multiplying the per-unit full factor costs for style
change (i.e., including the actual added production costs of pro-
ducing the redesigned vehicle) as calculated at $600 by Fisher,
70. AD~n~uinTmR PaicEs, supra note 11, at 16, cited in Note at 588 n.115.
71. See ScHERER, supra note 52, at 95-97.
72. Note at 581-82.
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Gryliches & Kaysen, The Cost of Automobile Model Change Dur-
ing A Decade, 70 J. POL. ECON. 433, 450 (1962), by the output
(300,000 X $600 - $180 million.)7
3
As there is no explicit $600 per car figure on the page cited, and it is
difficult to know exactly what the Note means by "retooling" costs.
At page 437 of the article cited, a figure of $584 per car is given as re-
flecting some of the costs which Fisher attributes to style change. But
this figure includes the costs of automatic transmission, power brakes,
power steering, "extra" advertising, and the difference between the
actual prices paid for cars and the price that would have been paid if
consumers had purchased cars with 1949 specifications. It would seem
that the "extra" advertising figure should have been included in the
Note's estimate for advertising capital required. The rest of these fac-
tors should not be included in the costs of style change.
7 4
The Note may also be in error in not including any capital require-
ment for the small firm in the tooling area. As mentioned earlier, the
small firm must pay a price for components covering the tooling cost
of its suppliers, even if it does not make the actual capital outlay for
tooling. (In some instances, the components supplier may require that
the purchaser of the components actually purchase the tooling.)76 The
Note fails to capitalize these costs. It seems inconsistent for the Note to
indicate that the dollar outlays needed to cover advertising expendi-
tures constitute a capital requirement for the assembler, while the
dollar outlays necessary to cover tooling costs are not a similar require-
ment.
In sum, it appears that the alleged differences in capital require-
ments between the assembler and the integrated producer can be attrib-
uted to three things: The integrated producer is producing a larger
volume of output than the assembler; is involved in more stages of
production than the assembler; and has costs which have been capital-
ized and included as a "capital requirement," while the costs of the
assembler have not been similarly capitalized. Thus, the $724 million
difference in capital requirements, assumed by the Note to be caused
by style change, is attributable to other factors. The Note fails, there-
fore, to link annual style change to the "preservation" of concentra-
tion in the automobile industry.
70
73. Id. at 588-89 n.115.
74. WHnTE, supra note 3, at 263.
75. See Alexander, Market Practices and Collective Bargaining in Automotive Parts, 69
J. POL. ECON. 15, 15-16 (1961).
76. The Note also indicates that the "Kaiser-Frazier experience" shows how annual
style change preserves concentration. Note at 586. However, several factors were important
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III. Economic Performance and the Note's Proposed Remedies
After concluding its economic analysis of the automobile industry,
the Note gives its legal argument for dissolution. Since our focus is on
the economics of the Note, the rest of this comment will deal with eco-
nomic performance and the Note's proposed remedies.
A. The Note's Dissolution Remedy
Noting that the Big Three in the automobile industry have forty-
five assembly plants, all of which have capacities of more than 60,000
units, the Note suggests that it would be desirable to make these sepa-
rate, independent companies. The Big Three's parts and distribution
facilities would also be made independent so that the new assembly
firms would have a source of supply and method of distribution. The
Note argues this solution would enable competitors to assemble auto-
mobiles with improved performance characteristics.
If only the assembly stage of production is considered, forty-five
plant-firms could assemble cars in a reasonably efficient manner, since,
in fact, there are forty-five plants doing that today. On the average,
these plants could produce about 200,000 cars per year, for a total
annual volume of nine million autos. The Note indicates, however,
that under such an industry structure, "economists have estimated that
more than 100 additional firms could enter and compete effectively in
the automobile industry."' 7 Yet none of the economists cited explicitly
suggest this possibility38 For a stable industry structure with a market
demand of less than nine million United States-built units, the 145
firms would have to be limited to production of 60,000 units each.
The forty-five existing firms would have substantially higher assembly
costs than the new entrants, if they were forced by production regu-
lations to produce only 60,000 units in plants designed to produce
over 200,000.
Furthermore, economies of scale in advertising and components pro-
duction may be sacrificed under the proposed industry structure, creat-
ing higher costs of assembled cars. The problem of efficient compo-
nents production bears reemphasis. If an assembler produces cars which
in Kaiser-Frazier's failure, and there is no reason to single out style change. See Wnrrr,
supra note 3, at 67-70; Kaiser-Frazier-The Roughest Thing 'e Ever Tackled, FoRTUNE.
July, 1951, at 161. The only other evidence the Note gives is estimates by potential en-
trants of the scale necessary for entry into the auto industry. Note at 590. However, the
Note fails to link annual style change with these estimates.
77. Note at 610.
78. In fact, a careful reading of footnote 196 of the Note indicates that the Loescher
and Schupach statements do not suggest such a possibility.
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require specialized components (i.e., components unique to that assem-
bler), a 60,000 unit output will not be enough to achieve economies of
scale at the components stage. If the assemblers independently purchase
standard components, there may still be severe and recurring problems
of coordination between the assembler and the components supplier. If
the assemblers try to reduce these problems by coordination between
themselves, it is questionable whether they could still be called "inde-
pendent." And if an assembler tried to eliminate the problem via verti-
cal integration, the Note's author would presumably disapprove.
The Note's suggestion to "spin-off" the distribution system, so as to
open the system to all assemblers, is difficult to understand. Franchised
dealers, in the industry today, provide their own capital and are free
to sell cars made by several companies. According to Thomas Mann,
over 3,000 of the Big Three's dealers carry vehicles not made by their
principal supplier.7 9 If the Note's author wants each dealer to carry the
cars of evenly manufacturer, each dealer could sell annually only about
two cars produced by each manufacturer, since there are approximately
25,000 dealers. However, if each dealer is not required to sell cars pro-
duced by all manufacturers, it is unclear what mechanism will allo-
cate makes between the various dealers.
The dealer's ability to serve the consumer also needs examination.
While annual style change may have added to service problems, the
lack of interchangeability of components is caused primarily by prod-
uct differentiation between car makes. Eliminating or slowing style
change would bring a decline in number of year-specific models a
dealer must service, but the Note's proposal would increase the num-
ber of makes or brands which each dealer must service. The quality
of service to the consumer may decline if dealers start carrying many
different makes. If dealers carry only a few makes of cars, however, the
dealer system would look very much as it does today.
The Note argues that under its proposed structure competition
would increase the frequency of performance improvements.8 0 How-
ever, White indicates that
[t]he high visibility of automobiles, their importance as symbols
in our society, their multi-faceted nature, all point toward the
attractiveness of product behavior that stresses design change. De-
sign change and efforts toward design distinctiveness also maintain
and enlarge brand loyalty, reducing the price elasticity for each
79. Hearings on the Role of Giant Corporations Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly
of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 86 (1969).
80. Note at 609.
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company's own product. Further, these demand characteristics in-
dicate that extensive advertising should appear worthwhile. They
also provide incentives toward offering consumers a bigger and
more luxurious product. On the other hand, consumers' lack of
technical expertise should discourage product behavior that em-
phasized technological change. The fact that most technological
changes are hidden beneath the sheet metal, where they cannot
be easily displayed by proud owners, would also argue against this
type of product behavior.81
Since these characteristics of automobile demand would appear to be
unchanged by the Note's proposal, it seems likely that competition
would continue to emphasize styling rather than technological change.
The short-term costs of the Note's dissolution program would be
tremendously high, not only because breaking up the integrated firms
into the number of units it suggests, in a manner ensuring survival of
each unit, would be difficult, but also because the industry would incur
costs in learning how to cope with the new business environment. It
would take time for any viable components industry to evolve (even
if the Big Three's parts facilities were spun-off), and during this time
many of the assembly firms might run into insurmountable financial
difficulties. When all these factors are added to the loss of efficiencies
now flowing from integration, one must question whether the benefits
of the solution really do outweigh its costs. The Note's indication that
this solution might be politically infeasible is merely another way of
saying that the government would-properly-hesitate to take the risks
involved in such a drastic solution unless there were far greater cer-
tainty that alleged benefits would occur.
B. The Moratorium Remedy
The Note's alternative solution is a moratorium on annual style
change (with "performance" modifications excepted), combined with
supplemental relief, to encourage the development of independent
components suppliers and distribution systems. The Note's author rec-
ognizes that such a moratorium alone would not have significant salu-
tary effects on the performance of the automobile industry, but hopes
that, in combination with the supplemental relief, it would help bring
about a more open industry structure. New firms would enter an in-
dustry without style change and with "independent" components sup-
pliers.
81. WHITE, supra note 3, at 104.
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The moratorium solution is questionable on two grounds. First, the
length of the moratorium provides an interesting dilemma. If the
Note's analysis of the disadvantages suffered by small firms because of
premature scrapping is correct, then the moratorium should last long
enough to allow the smallest "efficient" assembler to fully amortize its
dies. This solution would, however, penalize other "efficient" assem-
blers which fully utilize their dies more quickly than the smallest effi-
cient assembler. -8 2 Furthermore, there is no economic rationale for the
pace of style change to depend on the length of time it takes the small-
est "efficient" firm in the industry to fully utilize its capital equipment.
Each individual firm should evaluate style change in relation to its own
demand and cost curves, and should change styles when the expected
increase in revenues is greater than the expected increase in costs.
Second, the Note suggests that a moratorium might not effectively
change industry structure, and that if it does not, dissolution may be
necessary. It has been argued above that annual style change was not
a primary cause of concentration in the automobile industry. If this is
correct and a moratorium on style change would not affect the industry
structure, dissolution would be mandatory. In effect, the Note is say-
ing that it would demand dissolution even if its analysis were proven
wrong by its suggested experiment.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
The Note utilizes some faulty data, fails to examine certain factors
lying behind its accurate data, and makes serious errors in interpre-
tation. Its proposal contradicts its earlier analysis; it fails to explain
or justify assumptions necessary to its argument. Finally, in some in-
stances, sources cited actually contradict the Note's analysis.
The Note's proposed solution of breaking up the automobile indus-
try would not remedy the alleged ills. In fact, there are good reasons
to believe that such a fragmented industry would provide less desirable
transportation to consumers, and at higher prices. It seems unwise to
penalize the consumer in order to change the structure of an industry,
when the proposed change appears to have little chance of providing
any real benefits.
82. Assume an 80,000-unit-per-year firm facing a style change moratorium of four years
and dies capable of producing 250,000 units. After 3y/ years, the firm will have fully
utilized its dies. If the moratorium is four years, the firm, to keep producing, would have
to replace its old dies with similar dies. If the firm then changed style at the four-year
end, this replacement set of similar dies would be only 1/3 utilized. This would give
the firm higher costs. One alternative would be not to produce at all for 7/8 of the year.
Another would be not to change styles at the end of the fourth year, but to wait until
6 1/4 years, when, if demand is maintained, the replacement dies will be fully utilized.
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